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HUMAN LIFE
FEDERALISM
AMENDMENT
I. LEGAL ASPECTS
WILFRED R. CARON, ESQUIRE
In addition to denying all constitutional status to any right of abor-
tion, the "Life Amendment"' would confer upon Congress and the states
"the concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortion."'2 Thus, it would
restore to the states the power which they had before Roe v. Wade3 to
deal with the matter of abortion; in addition, it would confer upon Con-
gress the same power." By conferring concurrent power on both levels of
government, the Life Amendment departs from the traditional division of
powers under which the regulation of such matters was left to the states.
Historical precedents, however, are not lacking. For example, the eight-
eenth amendment gave both Congress and the states concurrent power to
enforce prohibition.' In view of the national scope of the problem of abor-
tion, it is advisable that both levels of government have the power to leg-
islate against abortion.
By its own terms, the amendment neither prohibits nor restricts
abortions. Rather it grants Congress and the states complete discretion-
ary power to restrict and prohibit.6 Each sovereign can formulate and en-
force its own policy on abortion according to the will of the people whom
the legislators represent. Such a grant necessarily allows the possibility
that abortion may not be prohibited in particular circumstances. Yet, as a
matter of national policy, the Life Amendment is an unmistakable and
decisive declaration for the protection of the unborn.
Because the Life Amendment is directed against abortion only, legis-
See S. REp. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
2Id.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 See S. REP. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
0 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919, repealed 1933).
6 See S. REP. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
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lation under it would of course be subject to other constitutional guaran-
tees, for example, the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. Illustrative of the former would be the applica-
tion of the so-called "due process" right of privacy to the use of contra-
ceptives by married couples.7 Any earlier provision of the Constitution,
however, that might conflict with the Life Amendment, and legislation
pursuant to it, would be limited to that extent-the policy and provisions
of the Life Amendment would be controlling. In other words, no provision
of the Constitution could be invoked to dilute the plenary power to pro-
hibit abortion granted by the Life Amendment.
The significance of the term "restrict and prohibit" is simply to un-
derscore that the power may be exercised over the full range of legislative
possibilities. The legislators may choose to prohibit abortion entirely,
with no exceptions, or they may elect to implement such lesser degrees of
protection for the unborn as they may deem appropriate. They may also
use whatever enforcement mechanism they deem expedient.
With power granted to both the federal and state governments, a
question immediately arises concerning the reconciliation of conflicting
exercises of state and federal power. To understand how the conflict
would be resolved under the amendment, we must look to the term "con-
current power" as well as the proviso.' The only place in the Constitution
where the term "concurrent power" is used expressly is the eighteenth
amendment, which gave Congress and the several states "concurrent
power to enforce" the amendment by appropriate legislation.' Beginning
with the National Prohibition Cases, the Supreme Court held that the
grant of concurrent enforcement power gave each sovereign equal and in-
dependent authority to enforce the national prohibition policy enunciated
by the amendment, and that the statutes of both could be enforced as the
will of separate sovereigns.10 The power of each was derived from differ-
ent sources: in the case of the federal government, the eighteenth amend-
ment,11 and in the case of the states, the general powers reserved to them
by the tenth amendment."s Thus, criminal sanctions could be imposed by
both sovereigns for the same transaction without violating the double
7 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
8 The Human Life Amendment provides:
A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several
States shall have concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortion: Provided, That a
provision of a law of a State which is more restrictive than a conflicting provision of a
law of Congress shall govern.
S. REP. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
' U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII (1919, repealed 1933).
'o See, e.g., National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 383, 387 (1920).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919, repealed 1933).
" See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1922).
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jeopardy clause.' 8 It was also held in the eighteenth amendment cases
that both federal and state legislative schemes were enforceable despite
significant differences;" indeed, a state law prohibiting the possession of
liquor specifically licensed by federal law was sustained.'"
It has been suggested that the grant of "concurrent power" in the
Life Amendment would lead to the result reached by the courts under the
eighteenth amendment. Because that result was tied to a particular sub-
stantive constitutional policy, however, and was developed in the course
of construing a concurrent grant of power to enforce that policy, it is crit-
ical to examine and compare the nature of the grant in the Life
Amendment.
As was already mentioned, the Life Amendment does not expressly
prohibit abortions nor does it establish any degree of restriction. Substan-
tively nullifying a right to abortion under the Constitution liberates the
states in the exercise of their reserved powers under the tenth amend-
ment to restrict and prohibit abortions. Concurrently, it grants the fed-
eral government coextensive authority. Each sovereign is vested with dis-
cretion regarding the manner in which it will exercise its authority. Thus,
the parallel with the eighteenth amendment would seem intact unless
there is a vital distinction between a grant of concurrent power to enforce
an express, absolute constitutional policy or prohibition, as in the eight-
eenth amendment, and a grant of concurrent discretionary power both to
establish and to enforce basic policy, as in the Life Amendment. It must
be recognized that the concurrent power under the Life Amendment is as
much a power to establish substantive policy as it is a power to enforce.
Although certain policy decisions were also involved in the enforcement
statutes under the eighteenth amendment, they did not involve substan-
tive latitude. The potential for conflict between the laws of two sovereigns
under the Life Amendment is greater. The analogy to the eighteenth
amendment is less than precise. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that by
itself the conferral of "concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abor-
tion" is sufficient to guarantee that there will not be conflicts between the
laws of Congress and a given state in respect of the exercise of their pow-
ers under the amendment.
It is for this reason that the proviso was made part of the amend-
ment. It'requires that when both sovereigns act, what will emerge and be
given effect are the legislative provisions that most effectively accomplish
the goal of protecting the unborn.' 6 The proviso serves to prevent the
' Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314 (1926).
See Johnson v. State, 81 Fla. 783, 89 So. 114, 116 (1921) (state liquor laws may be valid,
though they differ substantially from federal enforcement laws).
" See McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 144 (1932).
" See S. REP. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982). The proviso allows a state law which
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supremacy clause from bringing about preemption by a provision of a law
of Congress that is more permissive of abortion than a conflicting provi-
sion of state law. The proviso, by dealing explicitly only with the situa-
tion in which a state law is more restrictive of abortion than a federal law,
is designed to let the supremacy clause operate when a provision of a law
of Congress is more restrictive of abortion than a conflicting provision of
state law. Thus, the design of the amendment is not to favor one level of
government over the other when conflicts arise between provisions of the
statutes of Congress and a state. Rather, the amendment requires pre-
emption in favor of those provisions that are more restrictive of abortion
than the conflicting provisions of the other sovereign's legislation. In a
nutshell, the amendment may be said to have a mini-supremacy clause of
its own which makes the protection of the lives of the unborn the
touchstone.
Finally, it should be observed that the term "provision of a law" is
used to refer to the points of conflict that are to be resolved under the
proviso. This is designed to ensure that when and if conflict arises and
some sort of preemption is required-and it should be understood that
this would be the exception-the entire legislative scheme of one sover-
eign or the other would not be superseded. Only the less restrictive, con-
flicting provision will be preempted, and the entire balance of that sover-
eign's legislative scheme will continue to be operative. In this way,
enforcement mechanisms of both sovereigns will continue to operate.
is restrictive of abortion rights to preclude a more lenient federal law. Id. Inherent in this
proviso is a protection against liberally drawn abortion statutes. Thus, it is suggested, the
unborn fetus is accorded greater protection.
